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Abstract 
This thesis explored the role of the Chinese business community during two periods of 
heightened tension in Sino-Japanese relations, the 2005 history textbook controversy and the 
2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute. Sino-Japanese relations are often described as having 
‘warm’ economic relations, but ‘cold’ political relations. While some scholars argued these 
relations can coexist without influencing each other, recent studies show that political 
tensions between China and Japan can also impact economic relations. Because of this, this 
thesis expected the Chinese business community to attempt to influence the government 
during periods of heightened Sino-Japanese tension. After an analysis of the voice of 
governmental actors and the business community in government publications and media 
sources published around the time of the 2005 and 2012 anti-Japanese protests, this thesis 
concludes that 1) Chinese businesses attach considerable importance to Sino-Japanese 
political disputes and in some cases attach more importance to these disputes than financial 
gain, 2) There is no clear evidence that public attempts to influence the government were 
made during these two periods.    
Introduction 
Over the past decades, China and Japan have become very important trade partners and 
increasingly economically interdependent. However, Sino-Japanese relations are also 
subject to political tension (Yahuda, 2013). This is visible in both a persisting political tension 
and recurring disputes, leading to temporally increased political tension (Reilly, 2014). Sino-
Japanese disputes usually flare up due to remaining issues with Sino-Japanese war history or 
territorial disputes, most notably over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Koo, 2009). A large 
amount of literature has been written on this unusual relationship, where economics thrive, 
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while political relations are tense. However, the role of the business community in Sino-
Japanese relations has not yet adequately been discussed in the existing literature. 
  Since China’s opening up and economic reforms, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, 
non-governmental actors have started playing an increasingly important role in foreign 
policy making (Kennedy, 2009; Yu, 2012). This trend still continues today and attention now 
needs to be paid to a wider range of actors, such as think tanks, the internet community, the 
business community and citizen movements (Jakobson & Knox, 2010; Lanteigne, 2015). 
Most of these have already received the necessary attention in Sino-Japanese relations 
literature, but research on the role of the business community lags behind. This thesis will 
attempt to start filling this gap in the literature by focusing on the role of the business 
community during two notable periods of heightened Sino-Japanese tension, the 2005 
history textbook controversy and the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute. 
  This thesis will start by providing a general background on Sino-Japanese tensions, as 
well as the 2005 and 2012 anti-Japanese protests, after which it will engage in a literature 
review of the ‘cold politics, hot economics’ discussion. Subsequently, the Chinese business 
community and its role in Sino-Japanese relations will be discussed. In the following section, 
I state the hypothesis that it is likely the Chinese business community attempts to influence 
the government during heightened Sino-Japanese tension. Afterwards, the thesis engages in 
two case studies, where I assess the demands and actions of the Chinese business 
community during the periods surrounding the 2005 and 2012 anti-Japanese protests. This 
thesis concludes by showing that 1) Chinese businesses attach considerable importance to 
Sino-Japanese political disputes and in some cases attach more importance to this than 
financial gain, 2) There is no clear evidence that public attempts to influence the 
government were made during these two periods.     
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Literature Review 
Tensions in Sino-Japanese relations 
During the decades after the Mao-era, China has gone through a period of tremendous 
economic growth. This growth has led to China overtaking Japan’s position of second 
economic power in the world in 2010 and Japan and China are now by far the largest 
economies in the East Asian region. Economically speaking, both countries are very 
dependent on each other. Japan is China’s second largest trading partner and China is the 
largest trading partner for Japan. Even though business between both countries is thriving, 
Sino-Japanese relations are not as warm as one might infer from this. In fact, Sino-Japanese 
relations can be described as extremely tense, with both sides having a large amount of 
animosity towards each other. This tension and animosity on the Chinese side is mainly the 
result of, in their view, problems regarding Japan’s attitude towards their war history and 
territorial disputes. Japan’s negative view of China is largely a response to Chinese anti-
Japanese sentiment and nationalism, but is also fuelled by the same territorial disputes and 
fear of China’s military rise (Genron NPO and China Daily, 2015).  
 During the Mao-era and the first decade of Deng Xiaoping’s reign, Sino-Japanese 
relations were significantly friendlier than they are now. Especially the first few years after 
China’s opening up and reforms in 1978 looked promising, as both were actively developing 
closer economic relations for mutual benefit, during these years Japan even called their 
policy towards China a “friendship policy” (Yahuda, 2013). These years were greatly 
beneficial to both nations and Japan quickly became China’s largest trading partner (Burns, 
2000). China and Japan’s relationship then looked promising during the early years of 
China’s economic modernization and Sino-Japanese trade has since then shown a very large 
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increase (Koo, 2009). Nevertheless, political relations have been less positive. Several trends 
and events have been the cause of this, which I will briefly discuss below. 
  First of all, the shift in balance of power has led to a change in how China and Japan 
view each other. China, growing into a new superpower, became a more confident and 
independent player in foreign politics, while Japan’s power was declining and became 
increasingly wary of China’s intentions (Yahuda, 2013). Secondly, the 1989 Tiananmen 
Incident greatly impacted the way Japanese saw China, which changed from a mostly 
positive view to a mostly negative view (Koo, 2009). Nevertheless, Japan was one of the first 
countries to end sanctions towards China (Fewsmith, 2001). The 1989 Tiananmen protests 
were also a turning point for Chinese domestic politics, as patriotism now replaced Maoism 
as China’s state ideology through the Patriotic Education Campaign (Zhao, 1998). Since 
patriotism in the Chinese context is strongly associated with anti-foreign sentiments, China’s 
rise in patriotism was accompanied by a rise in anti-foreign sentiments as well, especially 
anti-Japanese sentiment (Gries, 2004). Next to these sources of persistent tension, there 
have been several disputes with Japan, leading to large anti-Japanese protests in China, the 
most recent one being the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in 2012. After this dispute anti-
Japanese/Chinese sentiment reached new highs in the 2013 Japan-China Joint Public 
Opinion Poll, with 92.8% of Chinese having an unfavorable impression of Japan and 93% of 
Japanese feeling the same way about China (Genron NPO and China Daily, 2015). 
The 2005 and 2012 anti-Japanese protests 
The two case studies in this thesis are focused on the periods surrounding the 2005 
Japanese history textbook controversy and the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute. Both 
of these events triggered wide-scale protests in China. In this section, I will briefly discuss 
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the background for each event. 
  In 2005, anti-Japanese protests were triggered by two clear events: Japan’s attempt 
to gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and the publication of a 
Japanese history textbook on 5 April 2005, which, according to the Chinese, downplayed 
Japan’s war history (Khoo, 2014). Chinese discontent with how Japan addresses its war 
history finds its root in the 1980s, when a start was made by the Chinese government to 
promote patriotism as a new state-ideology, due to the Chinese Communist Party’s decline 
in legitimacy after the Cultural Revolution (He, 2007). In 1982 China protested against the 
Japanese publication of a Sino-Japanese war history for the first time since the war (He, 
2007). Furthermore, Chinese history textbooks now emphasized Japan’s role as the 
aggressor and events such as the Nanjing Massacre were now used as icons of Japan’s 
aggression (He, 2007). This new history education led to a large rise in anti-Japanese 
sentiment in China.  
  The publication of the Japanese history textbook was not the only cause for the 
protests, as prior to the outbreak of protests in April 2005, Sino-Japanese relations were 
already deteriorating. First, Japanese Premier Koizumi’s yearly visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, 
which in China is seen as a place where Japanese war criminals are honored, contributed to 
a rise of anti-Japanese sentiment in China (Khoo, 2014). Furthermore, the presence of a 
Chinese submarine and drilling teams for gas and oil in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone in 
November 2004, made Japan formally declare China as a national security threat (Khoo, 
2014). Further adding to the increase of anti-Japanese sentiment was the mention of 
Taiwan as a common strategic objective by Japan in a bilateral meeting with the US in 
December 2014 (Cui, 2012). In March 2015, Chinese protests against Japan’s attempt to gain 
a permanent seat in the UN security erupted, which were then intensified by the anger 
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about the 5 April 2005 publication of the Japanese history textbook (Khoo, 2014). 
  The 2012 anti-Japanese protested erupted due to the Japanese government’s 
announcement that it would purchase the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from a private owner. 
According to the Japanese government, the purchase was made in an attempt to solve the 
dispute over the islands, which regularly caused tension between China and Japan during 
the past decades (Reilly, 2014). According to the Japanese, they discovered the islands in 
1884, confirmed it was uninhabited, and made it part of Japanese territory in 1895 (Lee, 
2002). The islands were placed under the administration of the US after the signing of the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 and given back in 1971 after the signing of the Okinawa 
Reversion Treaty (Lee, 2002).  
  China did not protest about the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands until 1970, when there were 
signs that the islands could be a source of oil (Lee, 2002). According to the Chinese, the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have been discovered by China in 1372 and have been part of 
Chinese territory since 1534 (Lee, 2002). Nevertheless, during meetings for the negotiation 
of normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, the Chinese government told Japan that 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands “did not count as a problem compared to recovering normal 
diplomatic relations” (He, 2007). However, in 1978 the dispute flared up again, when a 
group of right-wing Japanese politicians demanded the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute to 
be resolved (Koo, 2009). The Chinese responded by sending more than a hundred fishing 
boats carrying Chinese flags to the disputed islands, escalating the dispute (Koo, 2009). 
Nonetheless, in 1979, the dispute was shelved, as Deng Xiaoping stated that China and 
Japan should set aside the dispute until joint development is possible (Lee, 2002). While the 
dispute was successfully shelved for over a decade, this could not prevent the dispute from 
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flaring up multiple times since the 1990s, most notably in 1990, 1996, 2004, 2010 and 2012 
(Koo, 2009).  
Cold politics, hot economics 
Generally speaking, Sino-Japanese political relations are rocky, while at the same time 
economic relations show a positive trend. The Chinese then coined the phrase “cold politics, 
hot economics” (经热政冷, jing re zheng leng in Chinese, seirei keinetsu in Japanese) to 
describe this relationship with Japan. This type of relationship is odd, as most international 
relations theories, such as integration theory, would suggest that warm economic relations 
also lead to warm political relations (Teufel-Dreyer, 2014). However, this effect does not 
seem to be visible in Sino-Japanese relations. Teufel-Dreyer (2014) even argues that while 
both sides understand the benefit of cooperation, commercial and strategic rivalries have 
actually become stronger. Koo (2009), however, argues that while economic ties may not 
have led to warm political ties, they have been a key factor in de-escalating Sino-Japanese 
disputes. Koo (2009) shows a pattern in major Sino-Japanese disputes between 1972 and 
2005, where nationalist sentiment is first used by both China and Japan, but later quelled in 
order to preserve economic ties.  
 A much debated question is the effect negative political relations have on trade 
relations. Many studies have been performed on this issue on the Sino-Japanese case, but 
also on other cases.  A study by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) of European countries 
showed that lower levels of trust between countries also had an important economic 
impact, causing less trade, investment and foreign direct investment (FDI). Research by 
Michaels and Zhi (2007) on the impact of political tensions between the US and France and 
growth of anti-US sentiment in France due to the Iraq War, showed that trade between the 
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two countries declined, together with a drop in tourism and business trips. Another study by 
Fuchs and Klann (2011) showed that countries that met with the Dalai Lama, would be met 
with animosity in China and a deteriorating trade relation as a result. 
  That negative political relations can have an impact on economic relations then 
seems to be clear. Nonetheless, there does not seem to be a clear consensus on the impact 
Sino-Japanese tensions have on trade relations. Davis and Meunier (2011) argued that 
during the 2005 Japanese history textbook protests, political tensions could at most be 
called a “cautious wind cooling optimism about the prospects for interdependence” and 
that no direct economic damage was done. Koo’s (2009) and Teufel-Dreyer’s (2014) 
research also suggest economic relations were barely affected. In contrast, Fisman, Hamao 
and Wang (2014) show through econometric analysis that during Sino-Japanese tensions in 
2005 and 2010 both Chinese and Japanese firms were significantly affected. 
  Above-mentioned literature focused on disputes before 2010 and it seems that 
economic damage was limited till then. However, the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, 
shows that the phrase ‘cold politics, hot economics’ may not be an accurate description of 
Sino-Japanese relations anymore. Research by Yang and Tang (2014) on car sales data 
showed that car sales were significantly affected by the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
dispute. Furthermore, statistics from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO, 2013) 
show that this dispute had a negative effect on trade volume between China and Japan, 
which dropped 3.9% in 2012 and continued to drop 5.1% in 2013 (JETRO, 2013). However, 
Armstrong (2014) argues that other factors such as rising labour costs in China are the main 
reason for this and that there is no clear evidence that suggests political tensions caused 
this drop. Nonetheless, since Sino-Japanese trade was affected by the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands dispute, this means that the ‘cold politics, hot economics’ phrase may need to be 
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rethought. 
  This thesis should be able to contribute to this discussion by highlighting the role of 
the business community. Due to the negative effect ‘cold’ politics can have on economic 
relations, it is likely the business community will try to influence politics. Despite this, the 
role of firms has so far mainly been researched through data analysis on trade volume or 
sales. However, insights into the stance and actions of the Chinese business community are 
also valuable for understanding what happens when Sino-Japanese tensions flare up. The 
“cold politics, hot economics” puzzle cannot be fully understood if the actual stance and 
actions of the Chinese business community is unclear. This thesis will attempt to gain a 
better understanding of this. 
The Chinese business community 
Before discussing the role of the Chinese business community in Sino-Japanese relations, 
the Chinese business community itself needs to be discussed. In this thesis, what is meant 
by the Chinese business community is mainly state-owned enterprises, Chinese business 
associations and any Chinese private businesses. State-owned enterprises are directly linked 
to the government and large state-owned enterprises have frequent meetings with officials 
about a broad range of issues (Kennedy, 2009). Business associations in China are many and 
are linked to the government in different ways. Some are financially dependent on the 
government, such as the Self-Employed Labourer’s Association (SELA), which could limit 
their autonomy. Others, such as the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), 
are financially independent, suggesting more autonomy. However, nearly all business 
associations in China are staffed with current or former government officials. Furthermore, 
they are all affiliated with a responsible government department (Kennedy, 2009).  
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  The composition of the main influential actors of the Chinese business community 
has changed various times since the Mao-period (1949-1976). Before the Mao-period, 
hundreds of chambers of commerce and industry guilds existed, but these were closed 
down in the 1950s (Pearson, 1994). The remaining ‘capitalists’ during this period were 
organised into the AFCIF by the Chinese government, but this was mainly used by the 
government to secure the obedience of the business community to the state (Pearson, 
1994). State-owned enterprises became the main actors during this period and some of the 
managers of these state-owned enterprises were recruited into the National People’s 
Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) systems (Kennedy, 
2009). Their influence, however, was only limited (Pearson, 1994). 
  Following Deng Xiaoping’s rule after 1978, more private businesses came into being, 
decreasing the relative importance of state-owned enterprises (Fewsmith, 2001). The 
influence of the business community during this period was generally still limited, as politics 
were still dominated by a small group of elites (Zhao, 1993). This was especially true during 
the years following the Tiananmen protests in 1989, where policy-making was dominated by 
a small group of ‘Party elders’ (Zhao, 1993). After the Tiananmen protests, private 
businesses were criticised as one of the causes of the protests, leading to a 15% decrease of 
private enterprises in 1989 (Fewsmith, 2001). However, after Deng Xiaoping’s trip to the 
south and the government’s decision to allow more forms of ownership in 1992, the 
amount of registered private enterprises soared from 139,633 in 1992 to 1,200,978 in 1998 
(Fewsmith, 2001). 
  Despite the changed policy on private enterprises, private entrepreneurs were still 
not allowed to join the Chinese Communist Party (Dickson, 2003). This changed under Jiang 
Zemin’s rule, who introduced the ‘three represents’ theory in 2000. One of the goals of the 
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‘three represents’ was to make the Party’s rule more democratic, as they opened the party 
to a wider range of actors (Dickson, 2003). As a result, the ban on entrepreneurs joining the 
party was lifted on 1 July 2001, meaning the path from the business community to the 
government was now much more open than before (Dickson, 2003).  
The business community in Sino-Japanese economic relations 
Literature on the role of the business community in Sino-Japanese relations is limited as 
most research focuses on either governmental actors, citizens (protesters, consumers) or 
macro-economic data. Nonetheless, businesses can have a significant effect on foreign 
policy making as well (Moravcsik, 1997). Already during the Mao-period, where no formal 
diplomatic ties between China and Japan existed, the business community played an 
important role in Sino-Japanese relations, especially from the Japanese side (Hsiao, 1977; 
Yanaga, 1968). Furthermore, the importance of the Chinese business community is likely to 
only have increased since then. 
  At the start of Mao-period, trade between China and Japan was extremely low, only 
totalling US$ 4.7 million in 1950 (Burns, 2000). This was in part due to Japan being pressured 
by the US to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan, meaning it was unable to establish 
formal diplomatic ties with China (Burns, 2000). Nonetheless, trade agreements were still 
negotiated privately and trade was still able to grow to US$ 151 million by 1956 (Burns, 
2000). Soeya (1999) shows that this was largely possible due to efforts by the Japanese 
business community. One obvious reason the Japanese business community put effort into 
maintaining trade relations with mainland China was the possible loss of China as a lucrative 
market, which they hoped to retain by helping and investing in China. Other than the loss of 
mainland China as a lucrative market, many Japanese businessmen were motivated by 
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feelings of responsibility to help China, as they felt guilty over the war (Soeya, 1999). 
Therefore, even though the US pushed Japan to break off relations with mainland China, it 
was largely due to efforts of Japanese business groups that trade continued in the 1950s 
(Yanaga, 1968). 
  During the 1950s, the Chinese and Japanese business community also played a 
significant role in cooling down at least one Sino-Japanese dispute. In 1958, two Japanese 
men ripped down a Chinese flag during a Chinese exhibition at a Japanese department store 
in Nagasaki. This occurred at a time when China and Japan were having trouble negotiating 
a new trade agreement and the incident was used by the Chinese government to 
discontinue economic relations, leading to a total standstill in Sino-Japanese trade (Hsiao, 
1977). The Japanese government had no intention to apologize for the incident, but 
Japanese businessmen quickly apologized after the incident (Hsiao, 1977). It was also due to 
efforts of both the Japanese and Chinese business community that trade eventually 
continued. Chinese and Japanese business associations already have frequent contact 
during the 1950s and in 1959 the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the Japanese 
General Council of Trade Unions agreed to continue trade with those business that relied on 
Sino-Japanese trade the most (Hsiao, 1977). 
  Starting from 1960, China started selecting ‘friendly’ Japanese companies, which 
were the only Japanese companies China would do business with during that time. The 
number of ‘friendly’ companies quickly grew from eleven in 1960 to 190 in 1962 (Burns, 
2000). Moreover, a Sino-Japanese Friendship Association was formed in 1963, which aimed 
to stimulate political and economic ties (“China-Japan Friendship Association,” n.d.). While 
Sino-Japanese trade relations stayed unofficial until the normalisation of Sino-Japanese 
relations in 1972, economic relations were then still able to develop. 
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  Therefore, the influence of the business community played a significant role in 
keeping Sino-Japanese trade relations on track during the Mao-period. Nevertheless, 
economic interdependence at this time was relatively small compared to now and the 
business community may therefore not always been able to have a large impact. In 1968 the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute flared up for the first time. Koo (2009) argues that because 
mutual economic dependence between China and Japan was insignificant at this time, 
economic interests were not important enough to immediately de-escalate the dispute. 
Despite this, cases such as the Nagasaki incident show that the impact of the business 
community was still quite large. Furthermore, Teufel-Dreyer (2014) argues that 
organisations like the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association still have been successful in 
working out Sino-Japanese disputes. The Sino-Japanese Friendship Association also states 
on their website their network has made a considerable contribution to normalisation of 
Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties (“China-Japan Friendship Association,” n.d.).  
  After the normalisation of diplomatic ties, trade volume between the two countries 
rapidly grew. The Chinese and Japanese economies became increasingly interdependent, 
and economic interests now started to play a more important role in solving Sino-Japanese 
tensions (Koo, 2009). Furthermore, the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association expanded 
during this period and new Sino-Japanese associations to promote private trade relations 
were formed, such as the Japan-China Economic association (JCEA website). It is likely the 
business community then also started to play a more important role in Sino-Japanese 
relations during periods of tensions. 
  Besides the increasing importance of the business community due to increasing 
economic interdependence and the rise of Sino-Japanese cooperation groups, there was 
also a changing environment within China itself. Decision making in China had become a 
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more open process and non-governmental actors now have more influence than before 
(Jakobson & Knox, 2010; Lanteigne, 2015). Kennedy (2009) shows that business lobbying is 
now very common in China as the government and business groups are in a “constant tug of 
war over policy advantages”. Furthermore, Yu (2012) shows that Chinese companies are 
playing an increasingly important role in Chinese foreign policy due to their large increase in 
overseas activities. Yu (2012) further points out that many of these firms are closely tied to 
the Chinese government. On the one hand this helps increasing the influence of firms, as 
this close connection with the government provides easy access to decision makers and 
monetary and political support. On the other hand this in some cases also limits their 
influence, as they have to adhere to the priorities of the Chinese government (Yu, 2012).   
  Considering the arguments above, it is then likely that the business community has 
an impact in Sino-Japanese relations now. The role of the business community became 
more important due to a growing economic interdependence between China and Japan and 
a more open political environment in China. Nonetheless, research on the actions and 
influence attempts made by the Chinese business community during Sino-Japanese tensions 
has not yet been adequately done. In this thesis I hope to make a start on filling this gap in 
the literature.  
Hypothesis 
Based on above literature, I expect the Chinese business community to have a considerable 
impact during periods of Sino-Japanese tension. During Sino-Japanese tensions, the Chinese 
government is usually under pressure by nationalist demands of the Chinese people (Reilly, 
2014). During periods of heightened Sino-Japanese tensions, the Chinese government often 
tolerates anti-Japanese protests for a certain period of time, before they are cooled down 
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for the sake of preserving economic ties (Koo, 2009). As said, the role the Chinese business 
community has during these tensions is not well researched yet. However, much recent 
research suggests it is likely the business community has a significant impact on foreign 
policy making (Lanteigne, 2015; Kennedy, 2009; Yu, 2012). Since Sino-Japanese tensions can 
have a negative impact on the operations of Chinese businesses, it is possible they will use 
their lobbying power to influence policy makers. My hypothesis can then be formulated as 
follows: During periods of Sino-Japanese tension, the Chinese business community will try to 
influence policy makers to cool down the tensions in order to protect their business. 
Method 
Measuring influence is difficult, the influence of the business community perhaps even more 
so. Further adding to this difficulty is the opaqueness of Chinese domestic policy-making. 
Indeed, lobbying in China is much more likely to be done through direct lobbying, than 
outside lobbying (Kennedy, 2009). Direct lobbying is done through direct contact with 
policymakers, while outside lobbying is done by pressuring policymakers through public 
relations methods. In this thesis I will only be able to examine outside lobbying and present 
clues on potential acts of direct lobbying. Therefore, I may not be able to fully uncover the 
influence the Chinese business community has (or does not have) in Sino-Japanese 
relations. Nonetheless, this study may still be able to identify possible cases of business 
influence. The purpose of this study is then not to fully uncover the influence of the business 
community, but to show these possible cases of influence and provide a discussion as 
starting point for further research. Since the role of the Chinese business community in 
Sino-Japanese relations is still a relatively understudied subject, I believe this will then be a 
valuable contribution. 
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  In order to research this question, I will conduct two cases studies, focused on two 
events that flared up tensions between China and Japan. The first case study will be on the 
period surrounding the 2005 Japanese history textbook controversy, which led to wide-scale 
anti-Japanese protests and boycotts in China. The second case study will focus on the period 
surrounding the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, which also involved wide-scale anti-
Japanese protests and boycotts. These two cases were picked because of the large amount 
of media attention they received and the seriousness of the disputes and thereby the 
likelihood of the business community attempting to influence decision-making during these 
periods.  
  The research method I will use is inspired by Dur’s (2008) research on the influence 
the business community in the European Union (EU) has on the decision-making process of 
the EU government on trade policy. This means I will use a mixture of two methods used to 
measure influence of interest groups in policy-making: process tracing and assessing the 
degree of preference attainment. While these methods are unable to provide ground-
breaking evidence, they should be able to provide a clear image of where the business 
community was standing at what time during periods of tension and if their demands were 
in line with those of the government. The ‘processes’ examined here will then be the 
periods of tension surrounding the 2005 and 2012 anti-Japanese protests. While the 
protests in these cases erupted due to different issues, the response to both cases show the 
same characteristics. Both cases featured wide-scale anti-Japanese protests and boycotts, as 
well as a surge in anti-Japanese sentiment.  
  Since I am unable to conduct fieldwork, I will rely on official government sources and 
media sources to examine my question. In these two case studies, I will try to determine the 
preference the government and the business community present towards dealing with the 
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tensions. Then, I will examine what the business community was saying at what point in 
time during these tensions. Did they attempt to influence the government’s actions? Did 
they voice their opinion during these tensions? If this was the case, how did the government 
then respond to this? Or, how did businesses respond to the demands of the government? 
  The stance of the government was identified by analysing official government 
publications and comments made by government leaders in both foreign and Chinese media 
(newspapers, magazines, etc.) during the periods of heightened tension. The stance of the 
business community was identified through analysing publications on websites of Chinese 
business associations and comments made by members of the business community in both 
foreign and Chinese media.  
 While answering these questions will only solve a small part of the puzzle and cannot 
provide evidence for any influence, it may be able to serve as a starting point for the further 
examination of the role of the Chinese business community during Sino-Japanese tensions. 
Case study 1: The 2005 Japanese history textbook protests 
On 9 April 2005, anti-Japanese protests erupted in Beijing. The Japanese embassy in Beijing 
was surrounded by protesters and attacked with rocks, while at the same time Japanese 
businesses were vandalized in other parts of the city. Anti-Japanese protests not only 
emerged in Beijing, but soon expanded to other major Chinese cities such as Shanghai, 
Shenzhen and Chongqing. Besides protests, Chinese citizens and certain Chinese businesses 
initiated a boycott of Japanese goods. The cause of these protests was the dissatisfaction of 
the Chinese people with the approval by the Japanese Ministry of Education of a Japanese 
history textbook, which they felt downplayed the Japanese war atrocities. The protesters 
wanted Japan to apologize and face up to their war history, but Japan instead requested an 
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apology from China for the anti-Japanese protests. Not only did China then not apologize, 
but it also announced its opposition to Japan’s candidacy for a seat on the UN Security 
Council on 12 April 2005, further heightening Sino-Japanese tensions. While a Chinese 
apology was not made, the Chinese government did put a stop to the anti-Chinese protests 
on 19 April 2005. 
  After initially tolerating the protests, the outcome of this period of anti-Japanese 
protests was then a government initiated halt, aimed at stabilizing Sino-Japanese relations 
and preventing further damage. This was done by censorship of anti-Japanese media 
coverage and internet content and a ban on anti-Japanese protests (Reilly, 2014). Besides 
this, Bo Xilai, the Minister of Commerce at that time, stated on 22 April 2005 that Japanese 
businesses in China are good for China’s economic growth and urged Chinese citizens to 
stop boycotting Japanese goods. He further stated that China would continue to stimulate 
economic cooperation between the two countries (Cheng, 2005). This outcome is in line 
with what I expect to be the desired result for the Chinese business community. How does 
this outcome then compare to the demands voiced by the business community during this 
period? 
 While I expected to find evidence of the Chinese business community supporting this 
outcome, a more complicated result was observed instead. First of all, the voice of the 
Chinese business community is not very visible in the media during the 2005 anti-Japanese 
protests. In contrast, the Japanese business community openly criticized their government’s 
actions and asked their government to, among others, apologize to China and stop visits of 
Japanese government leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine (Curtin, 2005; Yahuda, 2013). 
Furthermore, Japanese business associations made efforts to ensure a continuation of 
smooth Sino-Japanese trade. For example, a representative group for the Japanese 
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Association for the Promotion of International Trade led by former Japanese Prime Minister 
Ryutaro Hashimoto visited the Chinese Ministry of Commerce on 5 April 2005, which 
assured them it would continue stimulating economic cooperation between the two 
countries (Fu, 2005). 
  In the Chinese case, not only do we not see efforts like these, but we actually see 
that the businesses covered in the media actually seem to be more in favour of anti-
Japanese sanctions. To illustrate, several large business groups joined in on the boycotts of 
Japanese goods. Already on 1 April 2005, before the protests erupted, the China Chain Store 
and Franchise Association (accounting for 11% of retail sales in China) advised its members 
to stop selling Japanese products, such as Asahi beer (Bezlova, 2005). This move was then 
joined by Nongunshan Jituan, a chain of 1200 supermarkets, which also stated it would stop 
selling the products of Japanese companies deemed to support the controversial history 
textbooks (Watts, 2005). While these boycotts would almost certainly hurt business, it 
seems that for some, their anti-Japanese/nationalist sentiment is more important than their 
financial losses. Xinmeng, a supermarket chain in Shenyang also boycotting certain Japanese 
goods, stated that: “while they are prepared for a significant financial loss, this is a small 
price to pay for protecting the Chinese people’s self-respect” (Tang, 2005). Evidence by 
China Daily (6 April) shows that these boycotts were indeed held (“Shops called to,” 2005). 
Nevertheless, support for these boycotts also quickly waned after Bo Xilai urged to stop 
them on 22 April 2005, suggesting their impact was limited (Reilly, 2014).  
 Looking at above mentioned sources, it seems my hypothesis of the business 
community acting as a ‘counter’ to popular nationalism does not hold up. Instead of 
promoting economic cooperation between China and Japan, they joined the public in their 
anti-Japanese actions and are willing to suffer financial losses as a result. However, while 
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some of the above mentioned business are indeed quite large and can therefore not be 
called exceptions, I believe they may not be representative for the Chinese business 
community as a whole. It may well be possible that Chinese business groups in favour of 
mending Sino-Japanese relations are not speaking in public out of fear of being seen as pro-
Japanese. Perhaps they did not feel the need to speak out, since the government was 
already doing what they wanted it to do. It is also possible they did try to influence policy, 
but did this solely through direct lobbying, which is also the most common way of lobbying 
in China (Kennedy, 2009). Nevertheless, certain remarks by government officials and 
scholars during this period provide some support that is it likely that not all Chinese 
businesses possessed the same attitude as those in the above-mentioned examples.  First of 
all, government officials stressed on many occasions that anti-Japanese boycotts and 
sanctions were not in China’s favour. In response to the anti-Japanese boycotts Liu Jianchao, 
the spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that Sino-Japanese trade 
relations are beneficial to both countries and China does not wish to see the trade relations 
being impacted by politics (“Wai jiao bu,” 2005). On 22 April 2005, the former spokesman of 
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wu Jianmin, also stated in an interview on CCTV that 
he was concerned about the negative impact the anti-Japanese protests would have on the 
Chinese economy and believed that in case of deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations China 
would be the biggest loser (“Wu Jianmin,” 2005). The strongest example of the Chinese 
government showing its disapproval of the anti-Japanese actions, is the already mentioned 
statement by Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai on 22 April 2005. Not only did he advise against 
anti-Japanese actions, he also stated the Chinese government would protect Japanese 
businesses in China and wished to deepen Sino-Japanese economic cooperation (Cheng, 
2005).  
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  Besides these clear concerns of damage to trade relations if anti-Japanese measures 
continue, there is another clue that most businesses may in fact not be willing to take these 
losses for the sake of showing their dissatisfaction in this political issue. During the North 
East Asia Investment Exhibition, Wei Jianguo, the vice-minister of the Ministry of Commerce 
at the time, said that while he worried about political issues impacting economic 
cooperation, Sino-Japanese trade relations still did not show anything abnormal, despite the 
boycotts (“Shang wu bu,” 2005). Statistical evidence shows that Sino-Japanese trade 
relations indeed continued showing a steady growth, with Japanese exports to China 
growing by 8.8% and Japanese imports from China growing by 15.8% (JETRO, 2006). If that is 
the case, that suggests most businesses continued operating ‘as normal’ and were probably 
not in favour of anti-Japanese sanctions.  
  Nevertheless, it seems my hypothesis is questionable here. The government’s 
position during the 2005 anti-Japanese protests was clear: calm down the anti-Japanese 
protest in order to preserve stability in Sino-Japanese relations. In this case study there is 
little to no evidence of an impact of the Chinese business community on this decision by the 
Chinese government. Furthermore, it is even difficult to determine the demands of the 
business community during the studied period. Most media coverage of Chinese businesses 
focuses on those endorsing and participating in anti-Japanese boycotts, which suggests they 
are supportive of the popular anti-Japanese sentiment. However, since business continued 
as normal, it seems unlikely that these businesses highlighted in the media represent the 
majority of Chinese businesses. Therefore, while the sources in this study are too limited to 
draw any firm conclusions, the available media sources suggest that at least some Chinese 
businesses were more willing to use sanctions against Japan than the Chinese government 
in 2005. However, this stance quickly faded after the government spoke out against anti-
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Japanese sanctions, suggesting these businesses did not attempt to further influence policy 
during this period. 
Case study 2: The 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute 
On September 10, 2012, the Japanese government announced it decided to purchase the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from a private Japanese owner, claiming they hoped this would 
calm down territorial tensions. Rather than diffusing territorial tensions, this action 
triggered the largest anti-Japanese protests since 1972 and led to an enormous rise of anti-
Japanese sentiment in China. As in the 2005 case, protesters started protesting at the 
Japanese embassy in Beijing on September 15, 2012. The next day protests spread to many 
more cities in China and quickly went from peaceful protesting to violent attack on Japanese 
businesses, cars, etc. Several Japanese companies even had to temporarily close their 
offices in China out of concern for the safety of their staff. Furthermore, just as in 2005, 
Chinese citizens started to call for boycotts of Japanese products. The circumstances in this 
case study then looks very similar to those in the 2005 case. However, the responses by the 
government and business community show some significant differences. 
  During the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, the Chinese government took a 
much harder line than it did in 2005. On September 14, 2012, one day before the anti-
Japanese protests erupted, assistant Foreign Minister Le Yucheng condemned the Japanese 
purchase of the islands, stating the purchase is a “gross violation of China’s territorial 
sovereignty”. Le Yucheng finished his speech saying that China’s position on this will be 
shaken by any force and that the direction of Sino-Japanese relations now lie completely in 
the hands of Japan (Le, 2012). In 2005, the Chinese government stopped the anti-Japanese 
protests after a few days and urged Chinese citizens and businesses to refrain from boycotts 
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of Japanese goods. In 2012, the Chinese government actually stated it encouraged people to 
protest “rationally”, condemning violent protest, but supporting peaceful protest and 
boycotts (“Japan’s ‘purchase’,” 2012).  
   The reason the Chinese Ministry of Commerce spoke out to stop the anti-Japanese 
protests and boycotts in 2005, was mainly due to concerns for damages to Sino-Japanese 
trade relations, which would be unfavourable to China as well. What seems to have changed 
in 2012 is that the Chinese government is now willing to accept this damage. On 19 
September 2012, Shen Danyang, the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, said 
that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute will certainly affect and damage Sino-Japanese 
trade relations. He further said that it is fully Japan’s responsibility to solve this issue and 
that rational patriotic activity is justified till then (“Japan’s ‘purchase’,” 2012). On 17 
September 2012, a researcher affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Baisong 
Jin, even suggested to push economic sanctions on Japan, claiming this would hurt the 
Japanese economy far more than the Chinese (Jin, 2012).  
   China blaming Japan and China’s determination not to budge is a common sight in 
the Chinese media during the 2012 anti-Japanese protests. Nevertheless, around one month 
after the dispute, Chinese and Japanese Foreign Ministry officials were also meeting to 
negotiate a pact to solve the dispute (“Negotiation best,” 2012). China’s willingness to 
negotiate could still have to do with economic damage, which already became visible 
shortly after the dispute. Indeed, while business seemed to go on as usual in 2005, this was 
not the case in 2012. Statistics from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO, 2013) 
show that trade volume between China and Japan dropped 3.9% in 2012 and continued to 
drop 5.1% in 2013. While trade was already slowing in the months preceding the Japanese 
purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Sino-Japanese tensions seem to have played a 
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significant role in this decrease (JETRO, 2013). 
  However, when on 27 October 2012 China’s Vice Foreign Minister, Zhang Zhijun, 
gave a briefing to Chinese and foreign journalists about the dispute, his response to 
questions about the progress of consultations between the two Foreign Ministries shows 
that this was limited. Zhang Zhijun said that during these meetings China once again 
“pointed out its steely resolve to uphold China’s territorial sovereignty”. He further said that 
only Japan “correcting its mistake through concrete action” can put relations back on track 
and that till then China will “watch and see whose interests their move would eventually 
damage” (Zhang, 2012). It indeed seems China was not willing to budge as even several 
months later trade relations did not fully recover. In a Bloomberg article published 8 January 
2013, Dreyer pointed out that this time “it [was] not a blip” and that “China [would] 
continue to push its claims to sovereignty until Beijing get what it wants.” (“China-Japan 
Dispute”, 2013). 
  With trade relations being hurt and the Chinese government seemingly attaching 
more importance to the territorial dispute than economic relations, how did the Chinese 
business community then respond during this period? First of all, it is worth pointing out 
that it does not look like many Chinese businesses joined in on the boycotting of Japanese 
goods in 2012. While some businessmen such as Deng Huajin on September 12, 2012, the 
CEO of Qijiawang, a large home decor retailer in China, did call on the Chinese people to no 
longer buy Japanese products or travel to Japan until the Diaoyu islands dispute is resolved, 
it does not seem that as many large Chinese business chains boycotting Japanese goods as 
in 2005, but there are no numbers available to prove this claim (Zhao, 2005).  
  However, this does not mean most Chinese businesses in 2012 were now opposed to 
anti-Japanese sanctions, let alone attempting to soften the hard line the Chinese 
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government took against Japan. In fact, most sources suggest that Chinese businesses were 
also attaching more value to China’s territorial dispute with Japan, rather than financial 
gain. On 17 September, 2012, two days after the anti-Japanese protests erupted, the All-
China Federation Of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), representing 45,000 Chambers of 
Commerce and over 4 million members of the non-public economic sector, spoke out and 
condemned Japan’s purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, they stated to 
fully support the Chinese government’s decision and “will support all moves necessary to 
safeguard Chinese territory” (“ACFIC Condemns,” 2012). Since ACFIC represents such a large 
part of the Chinese business community, this gives us a good assumption of where the 
Chinese business community was standing in this case.  
  Nevertheless, concerns of what the heightened Sino-Japanese tensions would do to 
trade relations were also visible. Hu Shuli, an influential Chinese economic journalist, spoke 
out and said that using economic sanctions to punish Japan would be unrealistic, since the 
damages to China and the huge job losses due to this would be disastrous to China’s already 
weakening economy (Hu, 2012). Furthermore, claims of Japan hurting more than China are 
also questionable. One of the sectors suffering most economic damages during this period 
was the automobile sector. Toyota, Nissan and Honda all closed their factories for a few 
days due to safety concerns, furthermore, production was dropped due to an expected 
lower demand. This expectation turned out be correct as Japanese car sales were indeed 
less for at least several months following the dispute (Yang and Tang, 2014). 
  While this looks more damaging to Japan than China, the opposite may in fact be 
true. As Anderson (2012) argues on 21 September 2012, most Japanese automakers in 
China are joint-ventures, all having state-owned Chinese partners, meaning sales will hurt 
both sides equally. However, China may even suffer more than Japan, since Japan can still 
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depend on other markets, while China loses a large part of their domestic sales (Anderson, 
2012). This was reflected in the sales of Chinese automaker Dongfeng, who operates as a 
joint venture with Nissan and Honda, which saw a drop of 22% in sales in September 2012 
(Yu, 2012). Despite these losses, it does not seem the Chinese automobile industry did much 
to change the situation. While the Chinese Association of Automobile Manufactures did 
publish an article on expected losses due to Sino-Japanese tensions, there are no signs they 
took any action to influence policy in this period (“Zhong ri guanxi,” 2012). 
  Another sector that suffered a lot both on the Japanese and Chinese side is the 
travel industry. Ryosei Nomura of All Nippon Airways Co., the largest airline company in 
Japan, said that 46,000 seats had been cancelled between September and November due to 
the islands dispute (“China-Japan Dispute,” 2013). Ctrip.com, accounting for 40% of China’s 
online travel industry, said on 21 September 2012 that more than half of their group 
bookings for Japan during the ‘Golden Week’ (a yearly Chinese public holiday, starting on 
October 1, usually lasting seven days) were cancelled (Areddy, Chiu and Kachi, 2012). Since 
travels to Japan account for 20% of Ctrip.com’s international business, this is significant 
damage. However, also in this case we do not see any evidence of Chinese travel 
associations or travel companies attempting to influence the direction of the dispute. 
  Interestingly enough, these responses are in stark contrast to the responses of the 
Japanese business community. After the anti-Japanese protests broke out in China, 
Japanese business leaders quickly spoke out and urged their government to solve the 
dispute. On 19 September 2012, Yonekura Hiromasa, the leader of Keidanren, Japan’s 
biggest business association, told reporters of the necessity of “getting economic relations 
back on track” (Fackler and Johnson, 2012). In contrast to the Chinese business community, 
it then seems that Japanese business community attaches more value to economics, rather 
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than the territorial dispute. As Yuwaka Kazuo, professor at Asia University in Tokyo said: 
“They want to defend their territory, but few would do so at the expense of business.” 
(Fackler and Johnson, 2012) 
  The findings in this case study then suggest that the Chinese business community did 
not attempt to influence China’s policy towards Japan following the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
dispute. The ACFIC, representing a large part of the Chinese business community, declared 
to fully support the Chinese government’s position and any moves necessary to safeguard 
Chinese territory. The Chinese government proved not to be afraid of economic sanctions 
and it seems the Chinese business community may also be able to accept this as a 
‘necessity’. Even the two sectors most hurt by the dispute do not seem to have spoken out 
or tried to influence policy towards Japan. However, if most of China’s business community 
indeed supported the idea presented in the ACFIC’s statement, then their demands would 
already be in line with the Chinese government’s demands and there would be no need for 
action. 
Discussion 
Attitude of the business community and “cold politics, hot economics” 
While the sources in above case studies are limited and do not provide clear evidence, the 
results of both case studies suggest that my hypothesis does not hold up. Nevertheless, 
both case studies do provide some interesting findings. I expected the Chinese business 
community to respond in a similar way to the Japanese business community, who in both 
cases urged their government to resolve the dispute, so as to preserve economic ties. I 
assumed popular nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment would be a thorn in the eye of 
the Chinese business community, as this would hurt business. However, in 2005 at least 
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some Chinese businesses even participated in the anti-Japanese boycotts, seemingly 
possessing the same attitude as the citizens protesting in the street. Also in 2012, the 
Chinese business community was not ‘balancing’ against the negative anti-Japanese 
sentiment, as the Chinese business community seems willing to accept losses when Sino-
Japanese disputes occur. 
  The results of this study could be valuable in the ‘cold politics, hot economics’ 
discussion. As discussed earlier in this paper, it is questioned by scholars whether or not 
‘cold politics, hot economics’ is still an accurate description of Sino-Japanese relations. In 
this discussion, relatively little attention has been paid to the attitude and action of the 
business communities in both countries.  This study, focusing on the Chinese business 
community, suggests that when Sino-Japanese political relations turn ‘cold’, the Chinese 
business community attitude towards Japan also becomes ‘colder’. While no numbers are 
available, in 2005, at least some large Chinese businesses participated in anti-Japanese 
boycotts. The Chinese government then urged them to stop these boycotts, afraid this 
would hurt economic relations. The Chinese businesses participating in these boycotts were 
well aware of the damage these could cause, but still proved willing to do this. The results of 
the 2012 case also suggests that ‘cold politics, hot economics’ may not be a correct 
description of Sino-Japanese relations, as large representatives of the Chinese business 
community were in agreement with the government’s hard line against Japan. 
  I expected the Chinese business community to try to mend the relations between 
China and Japan in both cases. In 2005, the Chinese economy was still for a large part 
dependent on Sino-Japanese trade (Yahuda, 2013). For that reason, I would expect the 
business community to attempt to influence the government more in 2005, than in 2012, 
where China was significantly less dependent on Japan (Yahuda, 2013). However, economic 
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damage was larger in 2012 than in 2005, which should also be a reason for the business 
community to attempt to influence the government during this period. Nevertheless, the 
observed public response by the business community was in both cases not in line with 
what this thesis expected. 
  While data showed a slump in Sino-Japanese trade growth in 2012, some scholars 
still suggest there is no clear evidence that heightened Sino-Japanese tensions impact trade 
relations. For example, Shiro Armstrong (2014) cites data from the 2012 Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC) survey arguing that Japanese businesses were more 
concerned with other factors, such as rising labour costs, and that this was the main reason 
for the fall. While this may indeed be an important factor, the same survey shows that 
65.1% of Japanese businesses said that their business operations in China were negatively 
affected (JBIC, 2012). Moreover, 63.3% of Japanese businesses said they would rethink their 
business their operations in China due to what happened as a result of the 2012 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute (JBIC, 2012).  
  While the wide-scale consumer boycott in 2012 is in important factor, I believe 
above responses of Japanese businesses could also be influenced by the ‘cold’ position the 
Chinese business community takes towards Japan during tensions. The Japanese business 
community urged their government to warm relations with China multiple times during the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, but the Chinese business community responded in the 
opposite way. However, it is possible the Chinese business community did not feel the need 
to pressure their government, because the Japanese business community was already doing 
this. Nevertheless, the ‘cold’ stance of the Chinese business community, where disputes 
with Japan seem to trump business relations in importance, could be an important factor in 
Japanese businesses seeing China as an increasingly risky place to do business.     
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Problems with public statements 
Both case studies suggest that the Chinese business community did not actively try to 
influence policy during the two Sino-Japanese disputes. In 2005, some Chinese businesses 
were arguably more in favour of anti-Japanese sanctions than the Chinese government, who 
urged them to calm down. Nonetheless, there is no evidence they tried to influence the 
government’s position here. In the 2012 case, the demands of the Chinese government and 
business community seemed to be in line and no action was observed here as well. 
However, the fact we do not see any attempts to influence the government made in public, 
does not necessarily mean these did not take place. This research focused on public 
statements and there are several reasons to doubt the public statements by both the 
Chinese government and business community accurately reflect their stances in both cases.  
  First, the Chinese government may be required to take on a hard line towards Japan, 
so as to satisfy the Chinese nationalist or anti-Japanese sentiment. If the Chinese 
government does not take a tough stance towards Japan, this could make the Chinese 
government seem weak or provoke anger towards the Chinese government. Newspapers 
such as China Daily, run by the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, keep 
blaming Japan and present China’s hard line towards Japan. Nevertheless, some bilateral 
meetings were also held, but were either kept relatively quiet or presented as initiated by 
Japan.  
  This problem the Chinese government faces, could also be an issue for Chinese 
businesses. In both case studies, there have been no cases of Chinese businesses speaking 
out in favour of mending Sino-Japanese relations. When Chinese consumers are boycotting 
Japanese goods and even vandalizing shops selling Japanese products, businesses may want 
to avoid being associated with Japan, as the risk of this impacting their business is there. A 
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clear example of this can be found in 2012, where Japanese car dealers tried to distance 
themselves from Japan by hanging Chinese flags and banners showing support for China in 
their shops (Tian, 2012). Financial damage to Japanese car dealers was severe, but them 
publicly speaking out in favour of mending Sino-Japanese relations, may then have had an 
even worse effect. Various studies have shown that anti-Japanese sentiments in China can 
have a significant impact on the willingness of the Chinese consumer to buy from Japanese 
shops and buy Japanese products (Klein, Ettenson & Morris, 1998; Tian & Pasadeos, 2012). 
Therefore, it may be better for Japanese business or Chinese businesses selling Japanese 
products to distance themselves from Japan and show their support for China during 
periods of heightened tensions.    
Lobbying in China and further research 
This study shows that public influence attempts by the business community, as observed on 
the Japanese side, did not take place in China. Nevertheless, this study far from rules out 
that attempts to influence the government took place. China is sometimes still seen as an 
authoritarian state where other interest groups have limited influence on policy, but this 
influence seems to be growing. Studies, most notably by Kennedy (2009), have shown that 
lobbying in China is now a common activity and can be quite successful. However, if 
lobbying takes place in China, it is usually done through inside lobbying and is therefore not 
visible to public (Deng & Kennedy, 2010). Therefore, it is plausible that influence attempts 
were made during this period, but are unable to be observed in public sources. Nonetheless, 
the public sources in this study did provide valuable pointers of possible attempts to 
influence the government, which can be further researched. 
  While most literature suggests attempts to influence politics by the business 
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community are likely during periods of Sino-Japanese tension, there are also sources that 
suggest that Chinese and Japanese businesses may in fact have trouble lobbying during 
these periods. For example, Takegami (“Rising Tensions,” 2012) points out that Japan-China 
trade and business groups do not have strong connections or channels to get in contact with 
Chinese top officials during disputes. This lack of lobbying power is also mentioned by Feng 
(2006), who points out that Chinese business representatives do not travel with their 
government during interstate meetings and therefore have little influence during Sino-
Japanese tensions. This suggests access to decision-makers during Sino-Japanese tensions 
may be limited. 
  To truly uncover the position and action of the Chinese business community, further 
research would need to be conducted. The best way to do this seems to be interviewing a 
wide range of leaders of Chinese businesses and business associations such as the ACFIC. 
Furthermore, business could be surveyed and self-asses their influence during Sino-
Japanese tensions. 
Conclusion 
This thesis attempted to shed light on the role of the Chinese business community during 
periods of Sino-Japanese tensions by assessing their actions and demands during the period 
surrounding the 2005 Japanese history textbook issue and 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
dispute. This thesis provides two interesting findings: 1) Chinese businesses attach 
considerable importance to Sino-Japanese political disputes. In 2005, some businesses 
joined in on anti-Japanese boycotts and proved willing to suffer financial losses in the 
process. In 2012, large representative bodies of the Chinese business community 
proclaimed to do whatever necessary to safeguard Chinese territory. 2) Clear public 
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attempts to influence the government by the Chinese business community were not 
observed during periods of heightened tensions in 2005 and 2012. Despite this, I doubt no 
attempts to influence the government were made during these periods, as these are usually 
not publicly made in China. Further research through interviews or surveys would then be 
necessary to gain a better understanding of the position and action of the Chinese business 
community during periods of heightened Sino-Japanese tensions. 
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